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Children's Legal Rights Journal
The Baby Richard Amendments
and the Law of Unintended
Consequences
Diane S. Kaplan*

I. Introduction
On July 3, 1994, in the wake of the "Baby Richard" proceedings,' the Illinois Legislature amended the state's
Adoption Act in an effort to alter the outcome of that case.
The amendments, which were numerous, 2 included a Puta-4
3
tive Father Registry, a Best Interests Custody Hearing,
and a number of fast-track provisions intended to bring
closure to adoption proceedings on an expedited basis.
The Putative Father Registry permits a man who has
fathered a child by an unmarried woman to protect his
parental interest in the child by listing his name and identifying information with the registry within specified time
periods.6 Failure to comply with the registry's filing
requirements creates a virtually irrebuttable presumption
that the man is not the child's biological father,' rendering
him ineligible to seek custody of the child. 8 Compliance
with the registry entitles the man to notice of the child's
adoption proceedings, and opportunities to prove his paternity and challenge the adoption. 9 If the biological father's
challenge is successful the adoption petition will be denied
and the court will hold a custody hearing to determine the
placement option that is in the child's best interest. 10
The amendments were in large part the Illinois Legislature's attempt to resolve the problem of the "thwarted putative father:"" the man who has been "defrauded, deceived,
or in some other way prevented from establishing a relationship' ' 12 with his child by the mother. The thwarted putative
father presents a multifaceted dilemma because U.S.
Supreme Court case law recognizes the parental rights of an
unwed father only if he has "grasped" the opportunity to
develop a familial relationship with the child. 13 When a
putative father who does not know of the pregnancy or birth
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of a child fails to grasp that opportunity, he also fails to meet
14
the legal standard that protects his interest in the child.
In the Baby Richard case the thwarted putative father
dilemma was compounded by three additional issues. First,
Baby Richard was placed for adoption as a newborn, before
his biological father had an opportunity to develop a relationship with him.' 5 Second, there was considerable speculation that the biological mother, having surrendered her
rights to Baby Richard, changed her mind and colluded
with the biological father to regain custody of the child.
Third, and most significant, the Illinois courts took more
than four years to resolve the case. By enacting the Putative
Father Registry, the Best Interest Custody Hearing, and the
fast-track provisions the Illinois Legislature attempted to
reduce the potential for similar occurrences in the future. 6
This article examines the amendments to the Illinois
Adoption Act that were prompted by the Baby Richard
case. Part II explains how the amendments function within
the overall statutory scheme of the Adoption Act. Part Ill
examines the case law that has arisen under section 12.1,
the Putative Father Registry. Part IV examines the case law
that has arisen under section 20, the Best Interests Custody
Hearing. Part V concludes that the case developments have
yielded a substantial harvest of procedures, policies, presumptions and many unintended consequences.

II. The Statutory Scheme
Section I(R) of the Illinois Adoption Act defines a
putative father as a man who (i) is not married to the
mother; (ii) has not been judicially adjudicated the father
prior to the commencement of the adoption proceedings;
(iii) may be less than eighteen years of age; (iv) and did not
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father the child as a result of criminal sexual abuse or
assault.' 7 Section 1l(b) of the Illinois Adoption Act requires
the mother to sign an affidavit attesting to or withholding
the identity of the father.' 8 The mother's attestations of the
father's identity are irrebuttable as to her, but rebuttable by
the biological father.' 9 Consequently, the adoptive parents
are entitled to rely on the mother's identification of the
father but a putative father is not foreclosed from asserting
his parental interest in the child even if the mother attests
that another man is the child's father. 2°
The amended Act creates a five-step process by which
a putative father can protect his parental interest in a nonmarital child who is being placed for adoption. In step one,
the man must establish his status as the child's putative
father. He can do so in one of two ways. Under section
8(b)(1)(B), a putative father can marry the mother 2'; or live
with the child and hold himself out to be the child's biological father22 ; or make a good faith effort to support the child
financially before and/or after birth3; or otherwise develop
a relationship with the child. 24
In the event that a putative father's efforts to comply
with section 8(b)(1)(B) are thwarted by the mother, he still
can still protect his parental interest by complying with the
filing requirements of section 12.1, the Putative Father
Registry. 25 The putative father may register either before or
within thirty days of the child's birth.26 Compliance with
either the conduct provisions of section 8(b)(1)(B) or the
filing requirements of section 12.1 qualifies him to receive
notice of the child's adoption proceedings. 27 However, failure to comply with either provision forecloses the putative
father from receiving notice of the child's adoption,2' consenting to or contesting the adoption, 29 or thereafter asserting "any interest" in the child. 30
Section 12. 1(g) provides an exception to the registry's
time and filing requirements if the man can prove by clear
and convincing evidence 3' that he was prevented from
registering within the thirty-day period by "uncontrollable
circumstances., 32 The "uncontrollable circumstance"
exception, however, estops the putative father from defending noncompliance on the grounds that he lacked knowledge of the child's conception or birth or that, despite such
knowledge, he relied on the mother's misrepresentations
that he was not the father.33 This statutory estoppel is based
on the legislative presumption that participating in intercourse places the man on notice of the possible conception
of a child.34
In the second step, section 12a gives the putative father
thirty days from the receipt of notice of the adoption proceedings to file either a Declaration of Paternity or a Denial
of Paternity with the Adoption Court.35 If the man files a

Declaration of Paternity, section 12a also requires him to
file a Parentage Action36 within the same thirty-day
period.37 The purpose of the Parentage Action is to prove or
disprove the putative father's paternity of the child. The
adoption proceeding will be stayed while the Parentage
Action is pending.38
If the Parentage Action confirms the putative father's
paternity then, in step three, he will be entitled to participate
in the adoption proceedings.39 If the putative father consents
to the adoption, his parental interests will be terminated and
the adoption case will proceed.4° If the putative father contests the adoption and seeks custody of the child then, under
step four, the adoptive parents may seek a fitness hearing to
have the putative father declared unfit.41 If the fitness hearing determines that he is unfit, his parental interests will be
terminated and the adoption will proceed. 42 Absent an unfitness finding, step five is triggered and per section 20, the
court will hold a Best Interest Custody Hearing 43 in which
both the putative father and the adoptive parents will have
standing to seek custody of the child.44
Several additional amendments fast-track the adoption
proceedings throughout this process by (1) giving them
priority over other civil cases 45 ; (2) limiting judicial discretion to grant time extensions 46; (3) barring joinder of matters "not germane" to the adoption47; (4) imposing a oneyear time limit on revocation of consents and surrenders 48;
and (5) expediting appeals.49
The amendments, read in conjunction with the statutory
scheme of the Adoption Act,5° are intended to reverse prior
Illinois law that provided notice of the child's adoption to all
putative fathers, whether or not they had demonstrated a
commitment to the child.5' The old law also permitted a
putative father to intervene in a child's adoption proceedings and, unless found unfit, automatically gain custody of
the child.52 Frequently, however, a putative father's intervention would delay and frustrate the adoption proceedings
with no countervailing benefit to any of the parties.53
By fast-tracking adoption proceedings, limiting defenses to noncompliance with the Putative Father Registry, and
reversing the presumption that all putative fathers are
entitled to notice of adoption proceedings, the Illinois
Adoption Act now clearly places the burden on the man to
demonstrate his commitment to the child before the state is
obligated to recognize his parental interests.54 Failure to
meet that burden allows the state to shift its interest from
protecting the putative father's parental rights to protecting
the child's interest in obtaining the legitimacy and stability
of placement with a permanent adoptive family.55
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III. The Putative

Father Registry
A. The Concept of a Putative
Father Registry
Putative father registries create a triage of rights when
unwed parents cannot agree between themselves as to what
role, if any, the biological father should play in his child's
life. Typically in these situations the mother does not want
the biological father to interfere with her plans either to
raise the child or place the child for adoption. As long as the
mother maintains custody, current law gives her considerable latitude to thwart the father from developing a relationship with the child.
A putative father registry provides the man with a statutory means of preserving his parental interest in the child
that the mother cannot thwart. Mere filing with the registry
triggers a series of protective laws which, once complied
with, enable the putative father to seek custody of the child
notwithstanding the mother's desire to place the child for
adoption. Noncompliance with a registry, however, bars the
man from ever asserting his parental interest in the child. At
that point, the child's interest in a stable adoptive home
becomes paramount and"the adoption can proceed free of
parental disputes or impediments.

B. The Constitutional Framework
Illinois' Putative Father Registry was enacted against
a backdrop of four United.States Supreme Court cases that
address the "putative father consent requirement." 56 The
cases broadly divide putative fathers into two categories:
those who are entitled to notice of their child's adoption
proceedings and those who are not. In effect, putative
fathers who have demonstrated a commitment to rearing
their children are entitled to notice of and an opportunity to
consent to or contest their child's adoption.57 Putative
fathers who have failed to demonstrate a commitment to
their children forfeit their .parental rights in the children,
including the right to notice of adoption proceedings. 8
According to Stanley v. Illinois,59 a putative father who

demonstrates a commitment to the "companionship, care,
custody and management" ° of his child establishes a "substantial" interest in maintaining that relationship as against
the state's de minimis interest in disrupting it.6' Based on
this proposition, in Cabanv. Mohammed6 2 a putative father
who established a committed and caring relationship with
his two older children 63 was entitled to veto the stepparent
adoption of their mother's husband. 64 Contrarily, the court
held in Quilloin v. Walcott that the putative father had
forfeited the right to veto his child's stepparent adoption
because of his failure to comply with a state statute that
Children's Legal Rights Journal

required him to legitimize the child in order to preserve his
parental interests. 65
Along a similar vein, Lehr v. Robertson6 rejected a
putative father's efforts to veto his child's adoption because
of his failure to comply with the filing requirements of New
York's Putative Father Registry. In order to preserve the
right to notice of a child's adoption proceedings, the New
York law required only that the putative father mail a postcard to the registry setting forth his identifying information
and intention to acknowledge paternity of the child. 67
Under Lehr, the Constitution protected a man who complied with the statute, 6 but provided no protection
to a man
69
whose only link to the child was biological.
Illinois' Putative Father Registry must comply with the
framework set forth by these four Supreme Court cases. The
registry's "notice" and "no notice" categories of putative
fathers stem directly from Caban and Quilloin. In accordance with those cases, a putative father can qualify to receive notice of his child's adoption proceedings merely by
filing with the registry. The registry's filing requirements
are comparable to those of Lehr and do not appear to be so
burdensome as to thwart reasonable efforts at compliance.
The registry's "fast-track" provisions and exclusion of
the "no knowledge" defense are intended to eliminate
adversarial disruptions that prolong and prevent the adoption of children who do not have parents who have demonstrated a commitment to their well-being. These provisions are consistent with the Supreme Court's recognition
that when a putative father fails to step up to the plate, his
parental interest may yield to the child's interest in legitimacy and permanency.7 °
However, the registry may be subject to constitutional
challenge, not for what it provides, but rather, for what it
fails to provide. In Lehr, the Supreme Court upheld the
New York Registry but noted that "if qualification for
notice were beyond the control of an interested putative
father, it might be thought procedurally inadequate.",71 Consequently, Illinois' registry contains an "uncontrollable
circumstance" exception to its filing requirements which
suggests that noncompliance will be excusable under the
right circumstances.72 However, this exception may be
illusory since the statute does not set forth circumstances
that qualify for the exception and specifically excludes as
"uncontrollable circumstances" the father's lack of knowledge of the pregnancy or birth and his reliance on the
mother's misrepresentations that he was not the biological
father.73 Short of medical incapacity, imprisonment 4 or
alien abduction, it is difficult to conjure circumstances that
would qualify as an "uncontrollable circumstance." This
ambiguity in the statute will no doubt invite litigation that
will delay adoptions and defeat the intent of the fast-track
provisions. More importantly, the false promise of the
"uncontrollable circumstance" exception could so prejudice
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a putative father's efforts to demonstrate his parental
interest as to violate Lehr's admonition.
On a similar note, assuming that the Putative Father
Registry adequately protects the man whose sexual partner
and child reside within Illinois, it provides no protection for
the man whose partner and child leave the state without informing him of their new location. Because there is no interstate reciprocity among Putative Father Registries or similar
preservation of rights statutes, compliance with Illinois'
registry will not protect the man whose child is in another
state.75 That man's only legal recourse will be to file in every
state that has a registry or comparable law and, of course, he
will have no legal recourse in states where such statutes do
not exist. The lack of interstate reciprocity among registries
means that, for the man who does not know his child's location, even vigilant compliance with every available statute
may prove futile. If no amount of compliance with the law
can yield the law's promised benefits then a Putative Father
Registry like Illinois' may be subject to due process challenges because the burdens imposed by the statute do not
yield a reasonable chance of success.
Last, the Putative Father Registry may raise privacy
issues because, if taken literally, it requires a man to report to
the state every time he has sexual relations with an unmarried
woman if he wishes to protect his inchoate parental interests.
The privacy right established for married couples in
Griswold v. Connecticut76 and extended to unmarried individuals in Eisenstadt v. Baird77 was intended originally to
protect privacy in the most basic sense, that is, the right to
keep one's intimate relations beyond the prying eyes of govemment. Like all rights, however, privacy may be infringed
upon to protect compelling government interests. Tailoring
the adoption process to protect a man's parental interest in a
child probably justifies placing the burden of registering on
the man who knows or should know that he has impregnated
a woman. However, requiring a man who is thwarted from
registering for reasons well beyond his control to inform the
government each time he has nonmarital sex may be too
great an infringement upon his privacy. While instances
where a man would have preserved his parental interest had
he known of the child may be rare, their possibility challenges the presumption that ignorance of the pregnancy or
birth can never qualify as an uncontrollable circumstance.78

C. The Cases
1. In re K.J.R. and D.F.R. to Adopt O.J.M.
Within the first year of its passage, Illinois' Putative
Father Registry was challenged on fraud, due process and
equal protection grounds. In K.J.R. ,79 the mother originally
listed "T.M." as the father on the child's birth certificate
and in the adoption proceedings. 80 Accordingly, T.M.
consented to the child's adoption. 8' Before the adoption was

complete, however, the mother apparently changed her
mind and admitted that E.M.H., not T.M., was the true
biological father.8 2 She thereafter withheld her consent to
the adoption, failed to attend court appearances and refused
to participate in discovery. Eventually, her parental rights
were terminated. In the meantime, E.M.H. filed motions
to intervene in the adoption proceedings and to have his
parentage determined by blood tests.85 The trial court
denied both motions because E.M.H. had not filed with the
Putative Father Registry. 6
On appeal, E.M.H. first argued that although he had
sexual relations with the mother and was aware of her
pregnancy, he was deceived by her into believing that he
was not the father.8 7 The First District rejected this argument
as unsupported by the facts, unreasonable, and inconsistent
with the registry's policies and provisions. 8 The court found
that having intercourse with the mother during the period of
conception placed E.M.H. on notice of the possibility that
he could have fathered the child notwithstanding the
mother's representations.89 The court reasoned that despite
the mother's denial of his paternity, E.M.H. reasonably
could assume that he or another man was the father, but he
could not reasonably assume that he absolutely could not be
the father. 90 Quoting the statute, the court said, "[T]he
Putative Father Registry statute does not require certainty by
the putative father that he is in fact the biological father at
the time he registers with it. It defines 'putative father' as 'a
man who may be a child's father.' 9 The court further noted
that the fraud defense was inconsistent with the Putative
Father Registry, which provides a man who fathers a child
with a means of protecting his parental interest independent
of the mother's conduct, 92 but which also forecloses the man
from asserting his lack of knowledge of the pregnancy or
birth as a defense to noncompliance.93 The court added that
failure to file with the registry was "prima facie evidence of
sufficient grounds to support termination of such father's
parental rights under the Adoption Act." g The court concluded that this result was consistent with the registry's
purpose of balancing "the interests of the putative father
with the adoptive parents and, more overridingly, the child
whose interests are paramount." 95
E.M.H. next argued that the Putative Father Registry
violated his right to equal protection because it provided
fathers whose parental rights were terminated under the
Adoption Act with a shorter time period to adjudicate their
fitness than fathers'whose fitness was determined under the
Juvenile Court Act.96 Specifically, E.M.H. argued that under
the Juvenile Court Act a putative father was given thirty97
days from receipt of notice to assert his parental interests,
whereas, under the Adoption Act a man was entitled to
notice only after he had complied with the Putative Father
Registry. 98 That difference in treatment, he argued, was
irrational and unconstitutional. 99 The court disagreed. It
Vol. 22 + No. 4 + Winter 2002-2003
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reconciled the notice provisions of the Juvenile Court Act
with those of the Adoption Act by finding that under both
acts a putative father's noncompliance extinguished his right
to notice of adoption proceedings.' °° The court concluded
that since the consequences of noncompliance with statutory
prerequisites to notice were the same in both statutes as to
both categories of putative fathers, the differences between
the statutes did not create an equal protection violation. 101
E.M.H. last argued that the Putative Father Registry
deprived him of his liberty interest in developing a relationship with his child without notice and an opportunity to be
heard.' 0 2 The court rejected this argument on the grounds
that E.M.H. had waived any liberty interest he might have
had by failing to file with the registry.'°3 Relying on Lehr v.
Robertson,'°4 the court said that a putative father was constitutionally required to demonstrate a commitment to the
child in order to protect his parental rights 0 5 and under
Illinois law that requirement could be satisfied by filing
with the registry and commencing a Parentage Action. 1°6
However, when a putative father failed to meet these requirements his interest yielded to the child's interest in
obtaining an adoptive home. °7
On a final note, the court ruled that the blood tests
E.M.H. had procured to establish his paternity were inadmissible because they were irrelevant to the issue of his
noncompliance with the registry.108 In so ruling, the court
concluded that DNA tests are inadmissible to prove the
paternity of a putative father who did not preserve his
parental rights under the Putative Father Registry.' 09
2. A.S.B. v. Department of Child and
Family Services
In A.S.B. v. Departmentof Child and Family Services
("D.C.F.S.")" 0 the Second District raised the Putative
Father Registry sui sponte to reach a conclusion similar to
that reached in K.J.R. In A.S.B. the child had been
abandoned by her mother and taken into D.C.F.S. custody
shortly after her birth."' Despite D.C.F.S. representations
that it was unable to contact the mother, she did appear to
112
surrender her parental rights and submit to blood tests.
Nonetheless, D.C.F.S. claimed that her unavailability prevented it from identifying the father." 3 Accordingly, default
proceedings terminated the parental rights of the unknown
father and the adoption proceeding commenced.! 4 Before
finalization of the adoption, however, a D.C.F.S. report surfaced on the record stating that the mother had named the
petitioner as the biological father. 15 Thereafter, the petitioner appeared in the adoption proceeding claiming to be the
child's father. The court granted him a continuance until
December 30 to hire an attorney." 6 However, on December
19 the court granted the adoption decree without giving
notice to the petitioner. The petitioner attempted again to
Children's Legal Rights Journal

intervene in the adoption proceedings and subsequently
appealed the denial of that motion." 17 In his appeal, petitioner asserted, inter alia, that he had been denied his due process right to notice of the termination of his parental rights
and of the adoption." 8 Relying on Caban v. Robertson,"9
the court responded that although the petitioner was "presumptively capable of protecting his interest in such
notice"'' by filing with the registry, he had not done so
21
and, therefore, was barred from challenging the adoption.
The petitioner next argued that the time and filing requirements of the Putative Father Registry'22 subjected him
to gender discrimination in violation of his right to equal
protection.I 23 The court countered that the Putative Father
Registry's gender-based classification was substantially related to the important governmental objectives of (i) identifying and locating putative fathers who wanted to protect
their parental interests and (ii) facilitating adoptions.'24
Finally, the petitioner argued that he was thwarted from
asserting his parental rights by the mother's misrepresentations that he was not the father. 125 The court responded that
the registry provided the petitioner with a simple means of
protecting his interest in the child independent of the
mother's conduct.'2 6 The court concluded that his noncompliance was not excused by the mother's deception and,
therefore, extinguished all legally protected interests he
may have had in the child.'2 7
3. Tinya v. Qquinella W.
In Tinya v. Quinella W. ,128the Second District partially
reversed a trial court that had found a putative father unfit
for failing to file with the Putative Father Registry.' 29 The
issue before the trial court was whether the man could be
adjudicated an unfit parent under the Juvenile Court Act,
not whether he had any rights in an adoption proceeding
under the Adoption Act.' 30 On appeal the man argued that
the Putative Father Registry statute applied only to notice
requirements under the Adoption Act but not to termination
proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act.' 3' The appellate
court agreed. 132 However, the appellate court affirmed the
lower court judgment because it had based its finding of
that were appropriunfitness on several additional grounds
33
ate under the Juvenile Court Act.

D. Summary
Although few, these three cases have harvested a substantial yield of procedures, policies, presumptions and
burdens arising under the Illinois Putative Father Registry.
First and foremost, every case holds that noncompliance
with the Putative Father Registry filing requirements raises
an absolute bar to subsequent assertions of parentage with
respect to the adoptive child. Second, the cases uphold section 12.1(g) which estops the putative father from asserting
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as defenses either his lack of knowledge of the pregnancy
or birth, or his reliance on the mother's misrepresentations
of his paternity. Third, the cases are in agreement that the
new statutory scheme places the burden on the putative
father to preserve affirmatively his parental interest in a
child and penalizes him for indecision or delay.
However, a somewhat confusing distinction is developing with respect to whether noncompliance with the
Putative Father Registry should be considered in a fitness
determination. The K.J.R. court unconditionally stated that
failure to comply with the Putative Father Registry "is
prima facie evidence of sufficient grounds to support
termination of such father's parental rights under the
Adoption Act.' ' 134 In Tinya, the Second District held that
failure to comply with the registry could not be cited as 3a5
ground for unfitness under the Juvenile Court Act.
However, in A.S.B., the Second District sustained a lower
court finding of unfitness under the Juvenile Court Act
based in part on a D.C.F.S. report that two searches of the
36
registry had disclosed no listing of a putative father.
Whether these distinctions amount to a significant legal
difference awaits further case developments.

IV. The Best Interests

Custody Hearing
A. Background
The section 20 Best Interest Custody Hearing was enacted
in response to the public outcry after Baby Richard's custody was transferred from his adoptive parents to his biological father without either a hearing to determine if that
placement change was in his best interest or a plan to ease
his transition from one home to another. The handing off of
Baby Richard from the family he had known to the family
he had never met poignantly demonstrated the failure of the
Adoption Act to provide an opportunity for the child's best
interests to be considered when an adoption fails. Section 20
is intended to fill that statutory gap by instructing a court to
hold a custody hearing promptly when an adoption is vacated or denied. Section 20 grants standing to the adoptive
parents, the child, any biological parents whose rights have
not been terminated, and any parties who have been granted
leave to intervene. 137These parties may seek custody of the
child or present evidence relevant to the child's placement.
The court's custody determination is to be based on the
placement option that is in the child's best interest.38
Two cases of note have arisen under section 20 that
address the appropriateness of a Best Interest Custody
Hearing. In In re Adoption of Ginnell the appellate court
ruled that a Best Interest Custody Hearing must be held
when a stepparent adoption is denied and the biological

father is seeking custody.139 In In re Adoption of E.L. the
appellate court ruled that a best interests custody hearing
should not have been held when fraud vitiated the court's
jurisdiction over the adoption proceedings. 4

B. The Cases
1. In re Adoption of Ginnell
In Ginnell, a stepfather filed a petition to adopt his
wife's son.' 4 ' The child's biological father opposed the
adoption and sought joint custody.' 42 The lower court determined that the biological father was not unfit 143 and on his44
behalf entered visitation and temporary support orders.'
On appeal, the Second District admonished the trial court
for failing to hold a Best Interest Custody Hearing after the
adoption petition was denied.' 45 The court noted that
section 20 did not distinguish between related and unrelated
adoptions and remanded the case with instructions that the
trial court conduct a custody hearing on the biological
father's joint custody petition.146
The Ginnell case exposes a serious and possibly unintended consequence of section 20. In passing section 20 the
Illinois Legislature intended to secure stability and permanency promptly for children who were the subjects of
custody disputes. 147 Although section 20 does not distinguish between related and unrelated adoptions, the Legislature probably did not intend section 20 to upset settled custody arrangements between biological parents. In Ginnell,
the lower court may have declined to hold a custody
hearing because the biological mother already had custody
of the child. However, the appellate court's ruling that a
custody hearing must be held after a failed stepparent adoption, even when the child has always been in the mother's
custody, may discourage such adoptions if they raise the
risk that the custodial parent will lose custody of the child.
Furthermore, in Ginnell the mother and stepfather filed
an Adoption Petition a few weeks after the biological father
filed a Parentage Action. 4 This chronology suggests that
the Adoption Petition was an effort to thwart the putative
father's efforts to develop a relationship with the child. It is
possible, however, that in future cases the order of filings
could be reversed with a putative father seeking to seize
custody of the child from the mother and stepfather. Consider the following scenario: A putative father complies
with the registry and Parentage Action requirements.
Although his paternity of the child is confirmed, the mother
discourages him from developing a relationship with the
child. Furthermore, she is financially self-sufficient and
refuses financial support from him.
Over time, the man's interest in the child diminishes
and whatever relationship they may have developed slips
away. Five years later the mother marries and the stepfather
wishes to adopt the child. The putative father receives
Vol. 22 + No. 4 + Winter 2002-2003
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had not made any payments to New Beginnings.1 69 Instead,
they had paid $5,000 in cash to Capozzoli, and wrote
checks to Raphael for $1,000 and Adoption Consulting
Services for $12,650. 170 The later two checks were
deposited in an account belonging to Raphael. 171 The
adoption petition also included Marisa's Affidavit of
Identification which listed Theodore Perez-Gonzalez as
E.L.'s father. 72 Based on this affidavit the court granted
temporary custody of E.L. to the A.'s and terminated
the
73
parental rights of Marisa and Perez-Gonzalez.
In April, J.L. learned that E.L. had been placed for
adoption. 174 When he could not get the details from Marisa
he sought legal help. 75 He and Marisa attended a meeting
2. In re the Adoption of E.L.
with Veronica Baker, a Chicago Legal Clinic attorney.' 76
However, when Baker learned that Marisa had placed E.L.
In In re the Adoption of E.L. the First District ruled that
for adoption without J.L.'s consent, she excused Marisa
a Best Interest Custody Hearing had been held improperly
from the meeting.' 77 Thereafter, J.L. left the meeting 1 to
after an adoption was vacated on the grounds that fraud
78
obtain the name of the adoption agency from Marisa.
deprived the court of jurisdiction.11 The facts of this case,
Baker then telephoned New Beginnings and spoke with its
hopefully, are unusual. E.L. was born in 1995.152 In the foldirector, Rita Sankey, who incorrectly told her that E.L.'s
lowing two years her mother, Marisa, and her father, J.L.,
adoption was "already finalized.' ' 179 During the time she
53
shared in her caretaking and eventually married. Soon
after the marriage, however, Marisa left the marital home. 54 was excluded from the meeting Marisa reported to the
police that J.L. had assaulted her when he obtained the
For the following four-month period E.L. lived with her
name of the adoption agency. Consequently, J.L. was
father while his relatives provided daycare.'5 When Marisa
arrested as he left the clinic.8 ° Although Baker did not
attempted a reconciliation in 1998, J.L. expressed concern
believe Marissa's allegation, she was required by the
about her drug and alcohol use, and told her that she was no
1 56
clinic's policies to discontinue her representation of J.L."'8
longer welcome in his home. Marisa agreed to leave but
In July, Legal Aid Bureau volunteer William Dillon
soon returned with a police officer who helped her remove
7
assumed
representation of J.L. 8 2 Dillon drafted a letter to
E.L.lS Although Marisa did not inform J.L. of her new locaNew Beginnings, which J.L. signed, stating that he had
tion, she telephoned him frequently, promising that he could
1 58
been named E.L.'s father in an order of parentage and
visit E.L., but never followed through. For months J.L.
support and that he objected to E.L.'s adoption. 83
' The letter
searched unsuccessfully for Marisa and E.L. but was unable
159
also provided New Beginnings with an address and phone
to locate them. The police refused to aid J.L.'s search
number at which J.L. could be reached.'8 4 Capozzoli
because E.L. was in the lawful custody of her mother' 60
responded with a letter that did not disclose who he
In the meantime, the A.'s, residents of Florida, sought
represented
but which denied that J.L. was E.L.'s biological
to adopt a child. In 1996 they retained Larry Raphael,
father
and
asserted that J.L. had been reported to the
whom they assumed was an lllinois attorney, and paid him
1 61
D.C.F.S.
for
molesting the child. 8 5 Both assertions had
child.
a
adopt
to
behalf
their
on
$3,000 to place ads
been made by Marisa and both were false. Capozzoli ended
However, in May of 1997 Raphael was disbarred from legal
1
62
his letter by urging J.L. to "move on" with his life.8 6 At the
practice in Illinois.
Nonetheless, in 1998 Raphael
time, Dillon assumed that Capozzoli represented New
informed the A.'s that a two-year-old girl was available for
1
63
Beginnings, when in fact, Capozzoli represented the A.'s. 8 7
adoption through an agency called New Beginnings. He
In September, Capozzoli conducted a search of the
also told them that the mother was divorcing her husband,
64
Illinois
Putative Father Registry to find E.L.'s father.'8 8
who was not the child's father. After a brief meeting with
However, he searched under Marisa's name and the name
Marisa and E.L., the A.'s took E.L. home with them. 165 The
given to E.L. by the A's rather than under her birth name.8 9
next day Raphael introduced the A.'s to his "associate"
Capozzoli's search revealed that Perez-Gonzalez was listed
Louis Capozzoli who, they were told, would represent them
16
6
as E.L.'s putative father.190
in the adoption proceedings.
On October 8, 1998, the trial court entered a final judgOn March 9, 1998 the A.'s filed a petition to adopt
67
ment
order of adoption.' 9' Neither New Beginnings nor
E.L.' The adoption petition included affidavits from the
Capozzoli informed the court of their contacts with J.L. 92
A.'s in which they attested that they had paid $17,000 to
68
On November 24, 1998, with the aid of yet another
New Beginnings to arrange the adoption. In fact, the A.'s
attorney, J.L. filed a motion to examine and copy the court
notice of the adoption proceedings and petitions for custody
of the child. Perhaps he wants custody; perhaps he is upset
about the marriage; or perhaps he sees an opportunity to be
paid off. Under the Ginnell ruling, even if the putative
father is found to be unfit, his custody petition still would
disrupt and delay the adoption proceeding with no countervailing benefit to anyone. This scenario contravenes the
intent of the fast-track amendments which is to minimize
adversarial disruptions 149 in order to expedite adoptions."s°
More importantly, fear of such a scenario may discourage
stepparent adoptions if that procedure puts the custodial
parent at risk of losing custody of the child.
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file from the adoption proceedings. 93 The next day, the A.' s
learned for the first time of J.L.'s existence and objections
to E.L.'s adoption.' 94 On December 2, 1998, J.L. filed petitions to set aside the adoption based on lack of jurisdiction
and fraud. 9 5 When a paternity test confirmed that J.L. was
E.L.'s biological father, he moved for summary judgment
on the petitions.' 96
The trial court found that Marisa had surrendered E.L.
for adoption properly.' 7 It also found that Marisa's affidavit of identification falsely naming Perez-Gonzalez as
E.L.'s father created a rebuttable presumption of truth as to
that assertion. 198 The court further found that while
Capozzoli's actions had been "improper," they were not the
type of fraud required to vacate the adoption. 199 However,
the court did recognize that it had failed to acquire personal
jurisdiction over J.L. and, therefore, was required to vacate
the judgment of adoption regardless of its other findings. 2' °
Pursuant to section 20, the court then conducted a custody
hearing at which expert testimony concluded that E.L.
would thrive in either home.20' The trial court ruled that
E.L.'s best interests would be served by a joint custody
arrangement, with the A.'s retaining physical custody and
J.L. obtaining legal custody with visitation rights once he
established residence in Florida. 2 However, when the A.'s
and J.L. were unable to work out the details of the arrangement, °3 the court entered an order naming the A.'s as E.L.'s
physical custodians, J.L. as E.L.'s legal custodian, and
granting J.L. visitation rights on weekends, holidays and
summers once he assumed residence in Florida. 0'
On appeal J.L. argued that because the trial court had
failed to obtain both personal and subject matterjurisdiction
the adoption proceedings were void ab initio, thus vitiating
the requirement for a section 20 custody hearing. 20 5 In support of this argument, J.L. asserted that he was a necessary
and indispensable party to the adoption proceedings, was
never found unfit, had acknowledged his paternity, married
the child's mother, paid child support, openly held himself
out as E.L.'s father, and had not consented to E.L.'s adoption. 20 6 Accordingly, E.L. never became "available for
adoption" pursuant to 750 Illinois Compiled Statute
§ 50/5. 207 The appellate court agreed. 208 It ruled that
Capozzoli's conduct constituted a deliberate fraud on the
20 9
court and that his conduct could be imputed to the A.'s
The court further found that Capozzoli's fraud prevented
the lower court from obtaining personal jurisdiction over
J.L. and, therefore, that court lacked jurisdiction over all of
the adoption proceedings, including the custody hearing.2 '
The court also held that even if the A.'s had been entitled to
a custody hearing, the trial court's order granting physical

custody to them was against the manifest weight of the
evidence. 211 The court stated,
[Section 20 creates] a possibility that the best interests of
a child might lie with the petitioning adoptive parents or
some other third party, even where a biological parent or
parents have not consented or been found unfit....
[W]e do not view it as impacting on or eliminating
the presumption that in a child-custody dispute, the right
or interest of a natural parent in the care, custody, and
control of a child is superior to a claim by a third party.
The "superior rights doctrine" thus applies to a best
interest hearing under section 20.2"2
The court concluded that public policy supported voiding the adoption proceedings ab initio lest future adoptive
parents/attomeys be encouraged to engage in similarly
deceptive behavior
213 to gain the extra time needed to secure
a final judgment.
It took two and a half years and at least eight
attorneys 214 for J.L. to regain custody of E.L. During the
time that J.L. vigilantly searched for his daughter she was
developing a loving relationship with her adoptive parents.
Ultimately, E.L. was removed from their home and
returned to her father, but it cannot be doubted that the
price of unraveling this knot was more than dear to both
sets of parents and the child. Some of the responsibility for
this ordeal must be attributed to the lower court's failure to
come to terms with how the pervasive fraud on the court
affected its jurisdiction. Specifically, the lower court failed
to recognize (i) the relationship between the fraud that
deprived it of jurisdiction over the adoption proceedings
and (ii) the fraud that deprived it of jurisdiction over the
custody hearing; (iii) the relationship between the section
1 (b) evidentiary presumptions and the section 20 custody
hearing; and (iv) the relationship between 'The Superior
Rights Doctrine" and Section 20.
a) The Relationship Between Jurisdiction
and Fraud
The lower court failed to recognize that the entire
adoption proceeding had been tainted by fraud. Instead, the
court ruled that the fraud that occurred was not serious
enough to void the adoption. 215 The appellate court disagreed. It cited Marisa's affidavit falsely naming PerezGonzalez as E.L.'s father216; the affidavits of the A.'s
falsely attesting that they had paid New Beginnings when
they really had paid Raphael, Capozzoli, and Adoption
Consulting Services; Capozzoli's letter failing to inform
J.L. of the adoption proceeding,2 7 and his additional failure
to inform the court of J.L.'s existence. 218 These deceptions,
the court found, were intended to prevent the court, J.L.,
and the A.'s from learning about each other and to mislead
the court into believing the case was a valid "'agency
2 19
adoption' rather than a 'grey market' adoption for cash.,
Vol. 22 + No. 4 + Winter 2002-2003

Diane S. Kaplan
Illinois law is clear that an attorney's fraud is attributable
to his clients. 22° Illinois law also holds that when an adoption
is tainted by the fraud of the adoptive parents, or their
attorney or other agent acting on their behalf, the adoption is
void.22' When the fraud deprives the court ofjurisdiction, the
adoption is void ab initio. 222 This line of cases stems from
Pennoyer v. Neff's holding that lack of jurisdiction voids a
judgment ab initio and renders it unenforceable. 22
b) The Relationship Between Jurisdiction,
Fraud and Section 20
After the final adoption order was entered the court
acknowledged that it never had acquired personal jurisdiction over J.L. 224 Nonetheless, the court proceeded to conduct a section 20 custody hearing based on the assumption
that its lack of jurisdiction was cured by J.L.'s intervention
and filing of a post-judgment general appearance. 2
Although this assumption was consistent with section 20, it
misconceived the concept of personal jurisdiction.
First, and most importantly, a court either has personal
jurisdiction-the authority to take action against a person's
liberty interests--or it does not. There is no middle ground.
When the court recognized that it lacked jurisdiction over
J.L. and vacated the adoption order, it should have voided
all prior proceedings rather than assume that it had jurisdiction to conduct a custody hearing. If the court did not have
jurisdiction from the beginning it could not retroactively
obtain jurisdiction to bring the action to a final resolution.
Second, assuming arguendo that J.L.'s intervention or
post-judgment appearance could have cured the jurisdictional defect, the court did not permit J.L. to intervene in a
way that achieved that result. Typically, an intervenor is
entitled to full party participation rights which attach as if
the party had been joined at the commencement of the
action; i.e., the intervenor is entitled to participate fully in
the pleadings, discovery, trial and resolution. For J.L.'s
intervention to cure the jurisdictional defect, the court
should have given him the opportunity to claim and defend
as if he had been joined at the commencement of the action.
Instead, the court limited J.L.'s intervention to the postjudgment action and proceeded with the custody hearing.
Moreover, J.L.'s general appearance could not have cured
the court's lack of jurisdiction retroactively because, under
Illinois law, a general appearance submits a party to the
court's jurisdiction prospectively, not retrospectively. 226
On a more important note, J.L. argued that because
fraud rendered the court's jurisdiction void ab initio the
court should have proceeded as if no adoption action had
ever been filed. At that point, E.L. should have been
returned to J.L. because he never consented to her adoption
and never had been adjudicated unfit. 227 Instead, the court
proceeded to conduct a custody hearing. Perhaps the court
was unaware of how the fraud-on-the-court 22 deprived it of
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jurisdiction. Perhaps the court tried to duck the issue by
finding that the fraud was not the type that deprived it of
jurisdiction. 229 Or perhaps the court proceeded to the
custody hearing because the language of section 20 did not
give it another choice. Section 20's command that a court
conduct a best interest custody hearing upon the vacation
or denial of an adoption does not contain a fraud exception.
If a fraud exception is to be judicially imposed on section
20 the result will be a return to the Baby Richard
scenario-custody of the child will automatically revert to
whichever natural parent has not surrendered the child or
been found unfit. In the instant case, E.L. would have been
returned to J.L.'s custody without a hearing to determine if
that placement was in her best interest.
Section 20, however, was enacted to avoid the Baby
Richard result notwithstanding the errors that derailed the
adoption proceeding. That, in fact, was the whole point of
section 20-to provide a safety net to protect the child's
best interests notwithstanding the frauds and follies of the
adults. If a fraud exception is to be read into section 20
then, ironically, the fraud that vitiates the court's jurisdiction will vitiate substantially section 20 as well.
c) The Relationship Between the Section 11(b) Affidavit and the Section 20
Custody Hearing
Section 11 (b) provides that a mother who surrenders
her child for adoption may attest to the identity of the father
in an affidavit. 230 When Marisa filed her section 11(b)
affidavit she falsely identified E.L.'s father as Theodore
Perez-Gonzalez, who subsequently consented to the
adoption. 231 Even though Perez-Gonzalez's paternity was
contradicted by J.L.'s paternity test, the court assumed that
section 11 (b) foreclosed further judicial inquiry into J.L.'s
parental rights. 232 This construction, however, misconstrued
the purpose and function of section 11 (b)'s presumptions
and their relation to section 20.
Section 11(b) is a rule of procedural due process. It
allocates the burdens of pleading, proving or disproving
paternity. Section 1 l(b) creates two presumptions: an irrebuttable presumption as to the mother and a rebuttable
presumption as to the biological father. The irrebuttable
presumption arises once the mother has attested to the
identity of the biological father in her affidavit. There are
two consequences to this identification. First, the adoptive
parents are entitled to rely on it. Second, the mother is subsequently estopped to identify a different man as the father
if the adoptive parents have relied on her first identification.
The estoppel, however, binds only the mother, not the court
or the father. Instead, the statute creates a rebuttable presumption of paternity as to the biological father that shifts
the burden of proving or disproving paternity onto him.
Hence, the mother's affidavit does not foreclose the father
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from litigating the issue of paternity if she has misidentified
the father. The fact that the father's presumption is rebuttable assumes, of course, that the real father will be permitted to participate in the proceedings in order to rebut the
presumption.
As a rule of procedural due process, section 11(b) is
intended to aid in the implementation of section 20. Section
20 is a rule of substantive due process that creates standing
for specified persons to participate in a custody hearing
following a failed adoption. The lower court was correct
when it ruled that the A.'s were entitled to rely on Marisa's
identification of Perez-Gonzalez because section 1l(b)
provides that the mother's identification is conclusive as to
the adoptive parents. The lower court was also correct when
it allowed J.L. to establish his paternity because section
1 (b) provides that the mother's attestation is "rebuttable as
to the biological father. ' ' 233 The lower court was incorrect,
however, when it required J.L. to prevail at a custody
hearing in order to regain custody of his child. That construction suggests that section 11 (b) is not a procedural rule
of pleading, but rather a rule of substantive law intended to
substitute proof of facts with presumptions. That position,
however, runs counter to the specific language of the statute
that says the presumption of paternity is "rebuttable" as to
the biological father. Furthermore, the court's construction
of section 1l(b) effectively sanctioned Marisa's fraud by
allowing her to subvert J.L.'s parental rights and then force
him into a section 20 custody hearing to reacquire them.234
The court's construction of section 11 (b) confused the
reasons as to why the mother's presumption is irrebuttable
but the father's presumption is rebuttable. The mother's
presumption is irrebuttable because once she has given her
consent and the adoptive parents have relied on her affidavit,
she is estopped to change her story. The estoppel prevents
the mother from challenging the adoption and protects the
adoptive parents from claims of unlawful custody. The
father, however, is not similarly estopped because (1) he is
statutorily permitted to rebut the mother's identification;
(2) he has not consented to the adoption and, therefore, the
adoptive parents have not relied on his representations; and
(3) once any presumption is rebutted it no longer has any
evidentiary effect. Finally, the fact that the father is permitted to rebut the mother's paternity claim assumes that the
paternity issue will be subject to full litigation and not be
presumed. Hence, Marisa's false affidavit of paternity was
erroneously used by the lower court to foreclose further
inquiry into the fraud that permeated the proceedings.
On a more quizzical note, section 11 (b) provides that
the mother's identification of the father "shall create a
rebuttable presumption of truth as to the biological father
only." What does that clause mean when the mother identifies the wrong man? Since the wrong man is not the biological father can he, the wrong man, rebut the presumption

by establishing non-paternity? On its face, the statute
would seem to answer in the negative because once the
wrong man rebuts the presumption he is no longer the
"biological father" entitled to rebut the presumption. Consider also, if the wrongly identified man acquiesces to the
presumption of paternity (as in this case), is his consent
conclusive just because the mother named him? On the
other hand, a biological father who wants to assert his
parental rights will need to rebut the presumption only if
the mother identifies the wrong man. This issue raises the
question of who is "the father" who is permitted to rebut
the presumption of paternity-a challenger to the alleged
biological father or the biological father only?
d) The Relationship Between the Superior
Rights Doctrine and Section 20
The appellate court construed section 20 to be consistent with Supreme Court rulings that recognize the
"superior rights doctrine. '235 This doctrine presumes that
biological parents have a "fundamental right to the care,
custody and control of their own children" that is protected
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6
23 7
Under Troxel v. Granville
and Stanley v. Illinois,238 the
superior rights doctrine creates a presumption of custody in
favor of the natural parent that a third party can overcome
only by showing that good cause exists to rebut the presumption and it is in the child's best interests to be placed
with the nonparent. 239
The lower court heard testimony that E.L. would prosper
with either the A.'s or J.L. Based on this testimony the court
entered a joint parenting order virtually splitting custody of
E.L. between the A.'s and J.L.2 The appellate court reversed this ruling because Illinois' version of the superior
rights doctrine holds that when evidence supports the
custody of each contender, the tie goes to the natural
parent? 4' Hence, if fraud had not vitiated the lower court's
jurisdiction ab initio, its order granting physical custody to
the A's still would have violated the superior rights doctrine.

C. Summary
Ginnell and E.L. illustrate some of the problems that
are likely to arise as Illinois courts integrate section 20 into
the Adoption Act's statutory scheme. Ginnell raised the
possibility that section 20 may discourage stepparent
adoptions if that proceeding provides an opportunity for a
non-custodial parent to challenge the child's current
custody placement. E.L. raised the possibility that a judicially imposed fraud-on-the-court exception to section 20
could limit a court's ability to protect a child's best interests
in a custody determination.
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V. Conclusion
Sometimes laws function as intended and sometimes
laws have unintended consequences. The Baby Richard
Amendments were intended to provide putative fathers with
a statutory means of preserving their parental interest in
nonmarital children and children who are the subject of a
failed adoption, with a custody hearing to determine which
placement option is in their best interest. To some extent,
the case law that has developed under the amendments is
achieving these results. However, even when a case strictly
adheres to the language of a statute it may yield consequences that are beyond the intent of the amendments.
For example, while K.J.R. demonstrates how compliance with the Putative Father Registry can protect a father
from a mother's fraud, E.L. suggests how fraud can deprive
a child of the protections of a Best Interest Custody Hearing. Similarly, while Ginnell requires a custody hearing

following a failed stepparent adoption, it also raises the
specter that such hearings will discourage stepparent adoptions if they place the custodial parent at risk of losing

custody of the child.
Finally, K.J.R. and A.S.B. consistently applied the
estoppel provisions of the Putative Father Registry that bar
a man from raising ignorance of the birth, or reliance on the
mother's misrepresentations, as defenses to noncompliance.
However, compliance with the registry also forces the man
to chose between two constitutionally protected fundamental rights: the right to the "care, custody and control" of his
biological children versus his privacy right to be free from
government intrusion in the most intimate matters of his
life. This constitutional choice may well invite litigation
that disrupts and delays adoption proceedings.
Some of these consequences may have been foreseen
when the amendments were enacted. As to those consequences that were not foreseen, foreseeable or consistent
with the intent of the amendments it is now the role of the
judiciary to carefully craft rulings that negotiate these obstacles lest the amendments leave the adoption courts and
the interests they safeguard no better off than before their
enactment.
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1. The Baby Richard saga began in 1990 when Daniella
Janikova became pregnant by her live-in boyfriend Otaker
Kirchner. Kirchner financially supported Daniella throughout the
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pregnancy and they jointly planned for the child to be born at St.
Joseph's Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. However, shortly before
Janikova's due date Kirchner returned to Czechoslovakia and
Janikova moved into a women's shelter where she made arrangements for the child's adoption with the Does. From the outset,
Janikova refused to identify the child's father to the Does for fear
that he would oppose the adoption. In order to avoid the unknown
father's interference, the Does assisted Janikova in finding
another hospital for the birth. Shortly before giving birth Janikova
moved out of the shelter and into her uncle's house. By that time
Kirchener had returned to Chicago but was not informed of the
changes in arrangements for the child's birth. The child, Richard,
was born in March. In re John Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648,649-50 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993). Four days after Richard's birth, Janikova executed a final and irrevocable consent to place him for adoption and
the Does filed a Petition to Adopt, stating that the father was "unknown" and served notice by publication on "all unknown
fathers." That same day Baby Richard went home with the Does
where he remained for the following four and a half years. Id.
at 650.
After Baby Richard's placement with the Does, Janikova
continued to reside in her uncle's home. She avoided contact with
Kirchner who was insistent on learning of the child's well-being
and location. Although Kirchner was eventually told that the child
had died he persisted in his efforts to find the child. In early May
Kirchner finally was informed that the child had been placed for
adoption. Id.
On June 6, 1991, Kirchner filed an appearance in the adoption proceeding and one week later sought leave of court to file an
answer. As the adoption case proceeded, Kirchner and Janikova
reconciled and married. The trial court, however, dismissed
Kirchner's objections, finding that he lacked standing to oppose
the adoption because his parentage had not been established. Id.
at 651.
Kirchner then filed a Paternity Action on December 9, 1991
which resulted in a finding that he was Richard's biological
father. On December 23, 1991 the Does amended their Adoption
Petition to allege that Kirchner was an unfit parent and, therefore,
his consent to the adoption was not required. The trial court
granted the petition finding that Kirchner had "failed to demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility
in the welfare of the child" during the first thirty days of his birth
and, therefore, was not entitled to challenge the adoption. On May
13, 1992 the trial court entered a Judgment of Adoption. Id.
Kirchner appealed, challenging the court's finding of unfitness.
The appellate court affirmed the judgment, finding that it was in
Richard's best interest to remain with the Does. Id. at 648.
Kirchner then appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court which, on
June 16, 1994, reversed and vacated the adoption. The court
found that (1) the Does, their attorney, and Janikova had conspired to defraud Kirchner and the court by falsely attesting that
Kirchner failed to show a reasonable degree of interest in Richard
during the first thirty-day period immediately following his birth;
(2) the evidence did not support the finding that Kirchner had
failed to show a reasonable degree of interest during the first
thirty-day period immediately following Richard's birth and
(3) the appellate court erred when it based its ruling on Richard's
best interest when Kirchner's parental rights had been improperly
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terminated. In re John Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (1994). The Does
then filed a request for rehearing the Illinois Supreme Court and
a petition to stay the Illinois Supreme Court's ruling with the U.S.
Supreme Court. O'Connell v. Kirchener, 513 U.S. 1303 (1995).
In response to the Illinois Supreme Court's reversal of the
adoption, the Illinois General Assembly held an emergency
session in which it passed several amendments to the Adoption
Act in an effort to change the result of the case. One amendment,
§ 20, required a court to hold a Best Interest Custody Hearing
upon the vacation or denial of an adoption. In re John Doe, 649
N.E.2d 324, 328-29. Based on § 20 of the Adoption Act, and
§ 601(b) of the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, the
Does filed a petition for a Best Interest Custody Hearing. Id. at
329. Kirchner responded by filing a writ of habeas corpus on
Richard's behalf on November 15, 1994. Id. at 329. The Illinois
Supreme Court granted the habeas corpus on the grounds that
(1) the Does lacked standing to seek a custody hearing under
§ 601(b) because they had only "possession", but not lawful
"physical custody" of Richard; id. at 329-36, and (2) applying
newly enacted §20 retroactively to a finaljudgment would violate
the separation of powers doctrine. Id. at 336-38. Finally, amidst
much media fanfare, Richard was turned over to his biological
parents. Thereafter, the Kirchners separated. Richard continues to
live with Janikova, the only parent who voluntarily relinquished
her legal rights to him. However, since Kirchner still retains legal
custody, should anything happen to him the case would be
reopened. 'Richard'InquiryHaltedby Bilandic;IllinoisSupreme
CourtJusticeStops Reopeningof Case,C-. TRIB., July 29, 1997,
at 1. See also Anthony Zito, Baby Richard and Beyond: The
Future of Adopted Children, 18 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 445 (1998)
(providing a detailed account of the circumstances surrounding
the Baby Richard proceedings).
2.750 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 50/1,/8,/11,/12.1,/12a(1.5),/20,
/20a, /20b (2002) (effective July 3, 1994).
3. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 50/12.1 (2002).
4. Id. § 50/20.
5. Id. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 50/1 la (2002); 750 ILL. STAT.
§ 50/20 (2002).
6. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 50/12.1(a)-(b) (2002).
7. Id. § 50/12.1(h).
8. Id. § 50/12.1(g).
9. Id. § 50/12a.
10. Id.§ 50/20.
11. Mahrukh S. Hussaini, IncorporatingThwartedPutative
Fathers into the Adoption Scheme: IllinoisProposes a Solution
after the "Baby Richard" Case, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 189,
191 (1996).
12. Id. at 191-92 n.22.
13. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
14. Hussaini, supra note 11, at 207.
15. Id. at 190-92.
16. Shelley B. Bostick, The Baby RichardLaw: Changes to
the IllinoisAdoption Act, 82 ILL. B.J. 654, 655, at n.20 (1994).
17. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 50/1(R) (2002).
18. Id. § 50/11 (b) (2002).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., In re Adoption of E.L., 733 N.E.2d 846 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2000).

21. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 50/8(b)(1)(B)(i) (2002).
22. Id. § 50/8(b)(1)(B)(iii).
23. Id. § 50/8(b)(1)(B)(iv).
24. Id. § 50/8(b)(1)(B)(v).
25. Id. § 50/12.1(a)(1)-(4). When registering, a putative
father must state: any and all names that he is known by; an
address at which he may be served; his social security number;
his date of birth; all names the mother may be known by; her last
address (if known); her social security number and her date of
birth. In addition, he must also state the name, gender, place of
birth and date of birth or anticipated date of birth of the child if
known to him.
26. Id. § 50/12.1(b).
27. Id. § 50/12.1(g), §50/8(b)-(c).
28. Id. § 50/12.1(h).
29. Id.
30. Id. § 50/12.1(g).
31. Id.
32. Id. § 50/12.1(g)(1)-(2). See Hussaini, supra note 11, at
215-16.
33. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 50/12.1(g) (2002).
34. Bostick, supra note 16, at 657.
35. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 50/12a(2), (4) (2002).
36. Id. § 45/7 (2001); § 50/12a(2) (2002).
37. Id. § 50/12a(2)(5).
38. Id. § 50/12a.
39. Id. § 50/8(b)(1)(B)(vii).
40. Id. § 50/11 (a).
41. Id. § 50/8(a)(1).
42. Id.
43. Id. § 50/20 (2002). The court's custody determination
will be based on the best interests of the child standard as set forth
in section 5/602 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution Act. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. § 50/20.
46. Id. § 50/20b.
47. Id. § 50/20.
48. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 50/11 (a) (2002). See Meza v.
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